A decontamination station was set up on W.Va. 25 in the Nitro area following a fatal chemical leak and explosion at Catalyst Refiners Inc. plant in Nitro on Wednesday, April 22, 2026. The unit was operated by the ÂÒÂ×ÄÚÉä Fire Department Hazmat Unit, who were assisted by the St. Albans Fire Department.
A decontamination station was set up on W.Va. 25 in the Nitro area following a fatal chemical leak and explosion at Catalyst Refiners Inc. plant in Nitro on Wednesday, April 22, 2026. The unit was operated by the ÂÒÂ×ÄÚÉä Fire Department Hazmat Unit, who were assisted by the St. Albans Fire Department.
Courtesy photo
Federal investigators have released an update on their probe of an incident that left two workers dead and, according to the investigators, left four others seriously injured at a Kanawha County chemical facility in April.
The investigators’ update points toward key safety failures were present leading up to the incident at the South Falls, New York-headquartered Ames Goldsmith Corporation’s Catalyst Refiners, Inc. facility in Nitro, where they say a chemical reaction occurred and produced highly toxic vapors during the transfer of chemicals into a wastewater-receiving tank as part of decommissioning activities at the facility.
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Board on Thursday said that Catalyst Refiners lacked a written procedure for disposing of chemicals that drove the incident through the wastewater treatment system and that four full-face respirators at the facility weren’t equipped with filters that would protect against hazardous gases such as hydrogen sulfide, a highly toxic, colorless gas that can result in serious injury or death.
The CSB said emergency responders subsequently detected hydrogen sulfide at the facility.
Workers at the facility told the CSB that respirator use was no longer required after the facility transitioned from production to decommissioning, the CSB said in its update Thursday, adding that Catalyst Refiners also did not provide or require employees or contractors to use personal gas monitors.
There was a history of chemical incidents at the facility, which the CSB noted Thursday conducted silver and ethylene oxide catalyst-refining operations, reclaiming silver from spent catalyst and manufactured silver oxide.
As part of the decommissioning process, per the CSB, employees were disposing of chemicals that were still onsite. Two chemicals — A-50, a proprietary calcium chloride solution used as a coagulant — and M-2000A, a proprietary sodium trithiocarbonate solution used as a metal precipitant, were used to recover silver from the facility’s wastewater, the CSB said Thursday, also observing that a third chemical, nitric acid, was used in the reclamation process.
The CSB found that on April 22, the day of the incident, employees first pumped roughly 80 gallons of A-50 and 275 gallons of M-2000A from their storage containers into a wastewater receiving tank before beginning to pump diluted nitric acid from a tote into the same tank.
As the nitric acid was being pumped into the wastewater tank, employees observed a chemical reaction occurring and a fog forming over the tank, the CSB reported, adding that the employee operating the pump stopped the flow of nitric acid into the tank. The employee went outside to get some fresh air but then passed out before regaining consciousness, according to the CSB.
A supervisor, who had been notified about the issue with the chemicals, approached the tank area and also lost consciousness, per the CSB. Two additional employees not involved in the chemical transfer also entered the area to assist, the agency said, adding that one of the employees pulled the unconscious supervisor away from the tank area.
The supervisor recovered, but the employee who had come to the supervisor’s aid, as well as the one who also had entered the area, were both overcome by the vapors emitting from tank and later died, the CSB said.
A shelter-in-place order was issued for an area within 1 mile of the facility.
Twenty-two personnel, including four responders, were decontaminated at the site, and 18 were transported to local medical facilities for evaluation, the CSB stated.
“This tragic incident underscores the need to have clear procedures and safely manage the serious chemical hazards that can arise during facility decommissioning,†CSB chairperson Steve Owens said in a statement. “Although the CSB’s investigation is still ongoing, we are concerned that Catalyst Refiners did not require employees to wear respirators during decommissioning and also never provided or required workers to use personal gas monitors that might have alerted them to the presence of the highly toxic hydrogen sulfide gas.â€
Catalyst Refiners said in a statement Thursday that it has reviewed the CSB update and “understand[s] it reflects the significant efforts of the CSB to date in its investigation.†The company said it would “continue to cooperate fully with†the investigation, as well as with all other agencies involved.
CSB's focus moving forward
The CSB said in its update it would keep analyzing “key issues,†including:
Chemical hazards and incompatibilities
Decommissioning hazard analysis
Chemical disposal procedures
Personal protective equipment and atmospheric monitoring
Complete findings, analyses and recommendations, if appropriate, will be included in the final investigation report of the CSB, an independent, nonregulatory federal agency charged with investigating chemical incidents and hazards.
The CSB released seven final reports on industrial chemical incidents in West Virginia from 2008 through July 2023. Only Texas had more incidents prompting final reports from the CSB during that span.
M-2000A wasn’t on another federally required chemical inventory form annually mandated for industrial operators like Nitro’s Catalyst Refiners Inc., despite it being involved in the violent chemical reaction.
Emergency officials who responded to the fatal incident told the Gazette-Mail the inclusion of M-2000A in Catalyst Refiners’ chemical inventory list, called a Tier II Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory form, would have benefited their response and left them better prepared.
An August 2025 DEP compliance monitoring report for the facility noted that it was “in full swing, busy with one of their larger orders of the month,†with “the recent jobs they’ve received hav[ing] become larger.â€
The report was authored by an inspector, Bronwyn Harrison, who recalled not detecting any objectional odors while reviewing the exhaust pipes for a scrubber, baghouses and filter locations at the facility.
“Photos weren’t allowed inside of the facility, but everything we viewed was in working order, operating as intended,†Harrison wrote.
In August 2013, two workers were injured and transported to a hospital after a nitric acid spill at the Catalyst Refiners site prompted employee evacuations.
A September 2013 DEP inspection report stated that an inspection light fell into a reactor containing approximately 100 gallons of nitric acid, causing about 75 gallons of the acid to bubble over a vessel top onto a concrete floor as large amounts of heat and hydrogen gas evolved. The employees suffered minor acid burns and the floor was damaged, according to the report.
The Aug. 24, 2013, spill prompted an unannounced DEP site visit four days later at which then-Catalyst Refiners catalyst operations president Scott Schmidt said the facility was doubled in size two or three years earlier because business was growing, with operations expanding to 24 hours per day, seven days per week, according to the report.
The DEP informed Schmidt a permit determination should be submitted to its Division of Air Quality for plant equipment expansion shown by Schmidt, per the report.
On Sept. 3, 2013, 10 days after the reported 75-gallon nitric acid spill, an employee improperly filled a 1,200-gallon mixing tank with 60% nitric acid first instead of water and then acid, before adding 50% hydrogen peroxide, causing an estimated 80 gallons out of 250 in the tank to boil over onto an elevated catwalk, according to the DEP report.
There were no injuries, and most of the spilled acid was caught in plastic containers below the catwalk, according to the report. Schmidt reported hiring “a PR consultant to help him in the future,†the DEP report stated.
The DEP initially determined in June 2014 that Catalyst Refiners’ facility met the definition of a “stationary source†of pollution, thus subjecting it to more stringent regulations, because the company discharged or had the potential to emit over 6 pounds per hour and 10 tons per year, or could discharge over 144 pounds per day of any regulated air pollutant.
According to DEP records, that regulated air pollutant was particulate matter, which has been shown to have adverse impacts on respiratory and cardiovascular health through fine particles piercing the lungs and bloodstream. The facility had the potential to emit 7.01 pounds per hour, 30.7 tons per year and 168.2 pounds per day of the pollutant, per DEP records, after installing new pieces of equipment that included eight fiberglass vats and four electric ovens.
But in September 2014, the DEP stated in a permit applicability determination letter to Schmidt that a permit under state legislative rule governing minor stationary sources wouldn’t be required.
The DEP indicated its determination was based on information received in July 2014 indicating an increase in emissions wouldn’t exceed 2 pounds per hour or 5 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants, six pounds per hour or 10 tons per year of any regulated pollutant, or “trigger a substantive requirement of any state or federal air quality regulation.â€
In 2000, the DEP had determined that a permit wouldn’t be needed under the same state legislative rule for then-proposed construction of an unloading system for 60% nitric acid, including a 6,000-gallon storage tank for storage of liquid and vapor generation of nitric acid, determining the system wouldn’t exceed hazardous air pollutant limits.
The initial facility construction permit application was filed in 1998.
Emission sources listed in the DEP’s August 2025 compliance monitoring report included nitric acid mist from a nitric acid tank and a nitric acid “day tank†that provide that acid to the process, oxide reactors, fiberglass vats and filter carts that produce non-regulated fumes, and a scrubber, vacuum screener and dust collector that produce particulate matter.
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